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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-4591 
 ___________ 
 
TERANCE HEALY; TODD M. KRAUTHEIM, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL ALABAMA; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ALASKA; ATTORNEY GENERAL ARIZONA; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL ARKANSAS; ATTORNEY GENERAL CALIFORNIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL 
COLORADO; ATTORNEY GENERAL CONNECTICUT; ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DELAWARE; ATTORNEY GENERAL DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL FLORIDA; ATTORNEY GENERAL GEORGIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL 
GUAM; ATTORNEY GENERAL HAWAII; ATTORNEY GENERAL IDAHO; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL ILLINOIS; ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANA; ATTORNEY GENERAL IOWA; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL KANSAS; ATTORNEY GENERAL KENTUCKY; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL LOUISIANA; ATTORNEY GENERAL MAINE; ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARYLAND; ATTORNEY GENERAL MASSACHUSETTS; ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MICHIGAN; ATTORNEY GENERAL MINNESOTA; ATTORNEY GENERAL MISSISSIPPI; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL MISSOURI;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL MONTANA; ATTORNEY GENERAL NEBRASKA; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL NEVADA; ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW HAMPSHIRE; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL NEW JERSEY; ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW MEXICO; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL NEW YORK; ATTORNEY GENERAL NORTH CAROLINA; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL NORTH DAKOTA; ATTORNEY GENERAL NORTHERN MARIANA 
ISLANDS; ATTORNEY GENERAL OHIO; ATTORNEY GENERAL OKLAHOMA; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OREGON; ATTORNEY GENERAL PUERTO RICO; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL RHODE ISLAND; ATTORNEY GENERAL SOUTH CAROLINA; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL SOUTH DAKOTA; ATTORNEY GENERAL TENNESSEE; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL TEXAS; ATTORNEY GENERAL UTAH; ATTORNEY GENERAL VERMONT;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL VIRGIN ISLANDS; ATTORNEY GENERAL VIRGINIA;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL WASHINGTON; ATTORNEY GENERAL WEST VIRGINIA;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL WISCONSIN; ATTORNEY GENERAL WYOMING; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL AMERICAN SAMOA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
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 (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-04614) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 3, 2014 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 








 Terance Healy and Todd M. Krautheim appeal pro se from the order of the District 
Court dismissing their complaint.  We will affirm. 
I. 
  Healy and Krautheim filed suit against the Attorneys General of Pennsylvania and 
every other United States state and territory seeking a declaration that Rule 1.6 of the 
“Rules of Professional Conduct” (apparently Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, as allegedly adopted in each jurisdiction) is unconstitutional.  Plaintiffs allege 
that they are involved in litigation in the Pennsylvania courts and appear to believe that 




                                                 
1
 Pennsylvania’s rule provides that, with certain exceptions, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed 
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 The Attorney General of Pennsylvania (hereinafter “Attorney General”) responded 
with a motion notifying the District Court that she intended to file a motion to dismiss the 
complaint on jurisdictional and other grounds and requesting that the District Court 
extend the deadline for all other Attorneys General to respond to the complaint, if 
necessary, until after a ruling on that motion.  The Attorney General reasoned that the 
grounds for dismissal would apply equally to the other Attorneys General and that ruling 
on the basis of her motion first would obviate the need for the filing and consideration of 
55 separate and likely duplicative motions to dismiss.  Plaintiffs opposed this procedure, 
but the District Court approved it.  The Attorney General then filed the promised motion 
to dismiss arguing, inter alia, that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge 
Pennsylvania’s Rule 1.6.  The District Court granted that motion and dismissed the 
complaint.  Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied 
as untimely under its Local Rule 7.1(g).  Plaintiffs now appeal.
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consent[.]”  Pa. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.6(a). 
2
 Plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration on the 28th day after the District Court 
entered its order dismissing their complaint.  Their motion was untimely under Local 
Rule 7.1(g), but it was timely under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and thus tolled their time to appeal.  See Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Their appeal is timely because they filed it within 30 days of the District Court’s 
denial of reconsideration, and we thus have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
District Court analyzed the issue of standing under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6).  
Under either rule, our review is plenary and “we accept as true plaintiffs’ material 
allegations, and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to them[.]”  Baldwin v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 73-74 (3d Cir. 2011).  We review for abuse 
of discretion the District Court’s denial of reconsideration, see Wiest, 710 F.3d at 128, 
and its orders regarding case management, see Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 783 




The District Court concluded that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Rule 1.6.  We agree.  Article III standing requires a 
concrete and particularized injury that is both traceable to the defendant’s alleged conduct 
and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 218 (3d Cir. 2013).  Plaintiffs’ complaint does not 
plausibly suggest any of these elements.   
Plaintiffs do not allege that they are lawyers bound by Rule 1.6 or that the rule has 
prevented any lawyer from providing them with any information to which they might be 
constitutionally entitled.  They appear to believe that Rule 1.6 has operated to their 
detriment in certain state-court matters, but they do not explain how except to offer 
conclusory and fanciful assertions that the rule has prevented them from obtaining 
appellate review or otherwise seeking redress from unspecified judicial misconduct.  Nor 
have they alleged anything suggesting that any injury they may have suffered is traceable 
to the Attorney General or likely to be redressed by a declaration that Rule 1.6 is 
unconstitutional.  Thus, plaintiffs lack standing as more thoroughly explained by the 
District Court, and the District Court properly dismissed their complaint without leave to 
amend on that basis.
3
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3
 The District Court also concluded that, to the extent that plaintiffs are attempting to 
invalidate state-court judgments or seek review of matters pending before the state courts 
(which they deny they are doing), it was required to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 
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Plaintiffs raise three arguments on appeal that we will briefly address but that lack 
merit.  First, they argue that the District Court erred by failing to certify to the Attorneys 
General that the complaint raises a constitutional challenge to Rule 1.6 and to permit 
them to “intervene.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(b) & (c).  Rule 5.1 addresses constitutional 
challenges to a “statute,” which Rule 1.6 is not, and the Attorneys General could not have 
“intervened” because plaintiffs named them as parties. 
Second, plaintiffs argue that the procedure employed by the District Court 
prevented the non-Pennsylvania Attorneys General from “intentionally defaulting” on the 
complaint.  We see no indication that those Attorneys General intended to default and 
would have done so but for the procedure employed by the District Court.  And even 
construing this argument as a broader challenge to that procedure, it lacks merit.  The 
District Court’s dismissal of the complaint as to the non-Pennsylvania Attorneys General 
might be characterized as sua sponte.  That dismissal was proper, however, because 
plaintiffs had notice and an opportunity to respond and the grounds for dismissal as to the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General apply equally to the other Attorneys General as well.  Cf. 
Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 500 (3d Cir. 2006) (addressing sua sponte summary 
judgment for non-moving party).  Indeed, the case for dismissal as to those Attorneys 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. 37 (1971), and to dismiss their complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see 
D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 
413 (1923).  The Attorney General concedes that the District Court’s Younger analysis 
does not survive the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Sprint Communications, 
Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013), but she argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
further supports dismissal of the complaint.  In light of our conclusion that plaintiffs lack 
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General is even stronger because plaintiffs do not allege that they have been involved in 
any litigation in those other jurisdictions.   
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred in denying their motion to 
reconsider as untimely under Local Rule 7.1(g) because it was timely under the Federal 
Rules (they refer to Rule 52(b), but it is Rule 59(e) that controls and the analysis under 
that rule is the same).  Plaintiffs did not mention the District Court’s order denying 
reconsideration in their notice of appeal, but even if we were to reach this argument we 
would reject it.  Local Rule 7.1(g) requires litigants to file any motion for reconsideration 
within 14 days after entry of the judgment or order concerned, while Rule 59(e), as 
amended in 2009, gives litigants 28 days to do so.  The District Court thus may have 
erred in relying on a local rule that conflicts with the Federal Rules, see In re Paoli R.R. 
Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 459 (3d Cir. 2000), but any such error was harmless.  
Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration merely reiterated meritless arguments that the 
District Court already had rejected.  Their motion thus did not state a basis for Rule 59(e) 
relief, see Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010), so there was no basis 
for the District Court to have granted it. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                                                                                                                             
standing, we need not and do not address these issues. 
